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Abstract 
In this article, I read the meeting between Abraham and Yahweh as an exemplary story about the contradictory nature of faith 
and freedom which the divinity gave to human beings, when God asked for the sacrifice of Isaac. This story is exemplary because 
it has a meaning that is grasped at the intersection between misterium tremendum and misterium fascinans. A short reflection on 
the issues of the interpreters (Philo of Alexandria, Saint Paul, Origen, Gregory of Nazianz and many others) will reflect the 
Judaism – Christianity dialogue in its richness and diversity, as a fundamental resource of modern thinking reverberated in the 
texts of Kierkegaard and Levinas.  
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1. Introduction 
Most of the times we tend to search the Greek philosophy or the history of European thought for moments that 
would express an obscure and enigmatic reality that we call by a syntagm which thus gains a symbolic value and 
concentrates in itself a fraction of the richness of human thought. One of those syntagm symbolic for a species of 
paradoxical reflection is the one referring to the answer Socrates gives when Euripides asks him whether he has 
understood a text belonging to Heraclites: “What I have understood is wonderful. I suppose that what I have not 
understood is equally good. However, I believe it would take a diver from Delos to explore the whole” [1]. What 
might look to a non-initiated like a tongue-in-cheek answer becomes an exemplary metaphor that expresses the need 
for an exceptional interpretation in order to dig out the carefully hidden thought which conveys something 
meaningful about man, his condition and the reality he inhabits. Let us remain in the world of the Greeks just to be 
able to leave one of the archaeological dimensions of European culture and find, within the Hebrew vein, a “story” 
that accounts for the mysterious nature of the relationship between man and god. The same Greeks know that things 
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are neither spoken plainly, not totally hidden because they have a meaning. Isn’t this one of the sparkles of Moses’ 
meetings with Yahweh, when the mortal sees God’s back? Similarly, an exemplary story regarding the contradictory 
nature of faith and freedom that divinity endowed man with is the encounter between Abraham and Yahweh when 
the later asks the former to sacrifice his only son, Isaac. It is exemplary because it has a meaning that we grasp at the 
end when darkness has been pierced and god’s words are crystal clear; when the divine power appears in what is not 
understood or it has an obscure difficult to reach meaning; when misterium tremendum and misterium fascinans 
identify themselves in the same hypostasis. This is why we are facing an exemplary story when we deal with 
akedah. 
Taking into account the dialogical relation between Judaism and Christianity, a short presentation of the 
discussion the commentators have developed on this exemplary story is necessary in order to meditate upon the 
hermeneutic richness and diversity the two faith founding hypostases belonging to these religious traditions have 
fuelled in the history of thought. 
Akeda, also known as Akedat Yitzchak, is the biblical episode (Genesis 22: 1-19) describing the binding of Isaac. 
In short, God asks Abraham to offer Isaac as a burnt offering on Mount Moriah. After a three-day journey, at the 
moment of performing the sacrifice, Abraham is stopped by an angel - Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do 
thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son 
from me (Genesis 22: 12) – and, seeing a ram caught in a thicket by its horns, sacrifices it instead of Isaac.  And 
Abraham called the name of that place Jehovahjireh: as it is said to this day, In the mount of the LORD it shall be 
seen (Genesis 22: 24). New testamentary additions identify the place with the mountain where Solomon will later 
build the Temple while other commentators believe that Mount Moriah is identical with Golgotha. 
Certainly, the common interpretation of this episode is that God is testing Abraham’s faith asking him to sacrifice 
his only son. Abraham, with or without an anguished heart, abides by the divine will and is eventually rewarded for 
his faith. However, certain inadvertences related both to the narration and to the general context of tradition have 
lead to numerous interpretations. 
Philo of Alexandria considered akeda as a protest against the pagan practice of sacrificing the first born [2] or any 
other child in situations of crisis (cf. 2 Kings 3: 27). Forbidden by the Mosaic Law (Leviticus 18: 21) and 
condemned by the prophets, the custom was practiced nevertheless by the old Israelites under the reigns of kings 
Ahaz and Manasseh (2 Kings 16: 2-3; 21: 6). 
Philo’s interpretation is shared by numerous exegetes. However, after with the return from the Babylonian exile 
and, later on, due to the development of Judaic mysticism and the suspicion, at least intellectually profitable, that the 
meanings of Torah would really be infinite, the interpretations of akeda have diversified. 
2. Akedah’s reflections in the Hellenistic literature 
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The story of Isaac’s binding experienced many embellishments during the late Judaic tradition, many of them 
concentrating on the merits of the action and on shifting the focus from Abraham to Isaac [3]. The degree in which 
this tradition influenced the New Testament is still debated. Only a few texts referring to the story of Abraham and 
Isaac can be dated for sure before the Christian era. They generally highlight the faith that Abraham demonstrated 
when he was tested. The Book of Judith indicates that fact that God tested not only Abraham, but also Isaac: 
“Remember what things he did to Abraham, and how he tried Isaac (…). For he hath not tried us in the fire, as 
he did them, for the examination of their hearts, neither hath he taken vengeance on us: but the Lord doth scourge 
them that come near unto him, to admonish them” (The Book of Judith 8: 26-27). 
The Book of Jubilees (2nd century B.C.), written in Hebrew, claims that the idea of testing Abraham comes from 
Mastema, the prince of the fallen angels, the same manner in which Satan suggested to tempt Job. One of the 
Qumran (4Q225) texts (3rd century B.C. – 7th century A.D.) may be the earliest testimony stating that Isaac was a 
willing victim who encouraged Abraham in his action [4]. This idea is obvious in the late literature (after 70 A.D.) 
and it is found in the Biblical Antiquities of Pseudo-Philo and Targum Neofiti. In the latter document, Isaac asks 
Abraham to bind him tight lest he should be able to hit him and make the offering improper. A similar request is 
supposed to have appeared in a gap from 4Q225, when Isaac talks to Abraham the second time, after the question 
referring to the animal sacrifice. The preoccupation for Isaac’s consent […] appears neither in the latest allusions to 
Genesis 22 (Ben Sirah or The Book of Jubilees), nor in the Greek fragment of the epic poem about Jerusalem of 
Philo, which, as a matter of fact, is unknown [5] 
3. Akedah – between ethics and hermeneutics 
Modern Judaism and, consequently, the Judaic philosophy in its entirety, medieval and contemporary, are 
incomprehensible without a perpetual reference to the biblical foundations. The biblical literature insists upon the 
idea of man’s submission to the divine will, of the omnipotence of God the creator of heaven and earth and his 
providence that affects all creation. But, “during the evolution of Hebrew consciousness, even within the revealed 
texts, one can notice a more comprising part, dedicated to the moral judgment of the individual” [6]. 
Specific to the Hebrew intellectual history is the fact that God is not considered a tyrant dictating unintelligible 
commands for man but, on the contrary, “they speak about a people endowed with ethical and dianoetic qualities” 
(Hayoun), moral and intellectual, because intelligence and consciousness are considered divine gifts. On the other 
hand, the divine commandments themselves presuppose a free subject to assume them and abide by them, and “most 
of these precepts distinguish themselves through a motivation of moral nature, fact which allows for a sort of 
coordination between the religious law and the ethical one” [7]. 
In the case of Isaac’s binding, we deal with a divine injunction through which God commands an apparently 
immoral act whose significances and meanings have to be clarified. A series of Jewish thinkers with apologetic 
tendencies have tried to prove that God wanted to test Abraham. In Maurice-Ruben Hayoun’s opinion “such an 
explanation seriously harms though the divine dignity as it presupposes that God is somehow ignorant and it seems 
to contradict the dogma of the divine omniscience the Bible is so keen on” [8]. 
In addition, to confer divinity such cruel features, as trying to measure the faith of a man by the sacrifice of his 
son, represents an attitude incompatible with an ethical divine nature. When Abraham does not seem to resist God’s 
command of binding Isaac, we see the abnegation of a patriarch who “finds legitimate to plea for others (Sodom and 
Gomorra), while submitting without saying a word when it comes to offer his own son to God” (Hayoun). 
The author of the Intellectual History of Judaism insists upon the preoccupation, specific to Jewish 
consciousness, for the deep meaning of this divine command, repudiating the naive hypothesis of putting man to a 
test and the resulting consequences. Thus, the rabbinic tradition develops the real dimension of a dilemma such as 
the one residing in Akedah and which opts for a different solution: “God (…) wanted to make Abraham know the 
suffering from love (Issure de-ahava). For it happens that God, in his unfathomable wisdom, may burden people 
with undeserved sufferings (trials) with the sole purpose of strengthening and purifying them; this way, the love they 
have for him grows in their hearts” [9]. 
Although it seems incomprehensible, God’s adversity determines the attachment of those who love him. In the 
divine consciousness, Abraham is “the one who loves Me” – a love that is stronger than death, even the death of his 
son, Isaac. 
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In the patristic literature, “Isaac’s binding” is a famous episode through its originality, drama and literary beauty, 
becoming a subject referred to ever since the writings of Saint Apostle Paul who confers a symbolic dimension upon 
it, Isaac foreshadowing the sacrifice and resurrection of Jesus (Hebrews 11: 17-19). Abraham’s sacrifice gains in the 
Christian iconography Eucharistic valences, by virtue of typological interpretation. 
Essential for the typological interpretation is the fact that the centre of both the Old, and the New Testament will 
be taken by Jesus Christ’s personality who, consequently, becomes a landmark for the interpretation of the Old 
Testament as well. Its central thesis is the interpretation of the Old Testament as a foreshadowing of Christianity 
[10]. 
Some, such as Origen, Justin the Martyr and Philosopher, advocate just the interpretation of the Old Testament 
through the New Testament. In the strictly literal interpretation of the Old Testament, the writings do not lead in any 
way to Jesus’ personality, as proved by the specificity of the biblical prophets’ messianism of the Old Testament 
who were waiting for a strong, political and historical Messiah to save the Jews from the Roman rule. 
The literal interpretation is not contradicted by the typological one; it is only its limits that are showed. The 
interpretation of the Old Testament according to the coming of Jesus could have gained shape only from the 
perspective of a Christian author. The goal was to find in the Old Testament the foreshadowing of Christ and the 
events related to Him, but for this to happen one should have had access to these events first. Therefore, the 
typological interpretation was a historically determined one. 
The Christian apologetics will try to distinguish between allegory and typology. For Justinian, the allegory was 
just a pagan error or a heresy, as opposed to typology by means of which, taking an event, such as the sacrifice of 
Isaac by Abraham, we find its significance through another event, such as the sacrifice of Jesus Christ by His Father, 
Isaac being a foreshadowing of Messiah. Thus, through the New Testament and the events described in it along with 
the coming of the Messiah, the Old Testament and the events in it are fulfilled. 
The essence of a typological interpretation as far as the Old and the New Testament are concerned resides in 
seeing that the New Testament holds the key to decipher the texts of the Old Testament. 
In the perspective of Christian commentators, one of the themes present in Genesis 22 is the testing of Abraham’s 
faith and the interdiction of human sacrifices as well as the identification of a worship place. According to Saint 
John Chrysostom, God did not tempt Abraham because He did not know what he would do, but to let those who 
lived then and those who have come ever since know the love the patriarch had for God and to know that he 
submitted entirely to the lord’s commands [11], and Saint Gregory of Nazianz sees that “Abraham, the great 
patriarch, makes an unusual sacrifice, an image of the great Sacrifice” [12]. 
Saint Cyril of Alexandria bushes the interpretation even further, showing that “the two servants that accompany 
the old man and walk till the third day stand for the two peoples called into slavery by the law, the people of Israel 
and the people of Judah, who thought that they should follow only the commands of God and Father, like the 
servants of Abraham, not knowing either the Son through Whom everything exists, or the Father’s Heir, Whose 
beautiful face is worn by little Isaac, in his father’s arms” [13]. 
The number of days of the journey has its special significance: (Then on the third day Abraham lifted up his eyes, 
and saw the place afar off). According to Origen, the third day is for Christians the day on which the Resurrection of 
Christ is announced, while for Cyril of Alexandria “… the fact that the two servants followed him till the third day 
and were not allowed to climb to the holly and high land, but were strongly ordered to stay there with the ass, shows 
that the two peoples (Israel and Judas) followed God till the third time, that is till the end, when Christ came to us” 
[14]. 
Clement of Alexandria believes, from a Gnostic point of view, that the first day is the day of seeing the beautiful 
things, the second day is the day on which the soul wants what is best for it, and on the third day it can distinguish 
the spiritual ones because the eyes of the mind have been opened by the Teacher who resurrected on the third day 
(Stromate, V, 73, 2). The same Clement of Alexandria says in The Pedagogue (I, 23, 1) that the wood for Isaac’s 
sacrifice symbolizes the Cross of Jesus, and Melito of Sardis thinks that Isaac’s binding foreshadows Jesus’ binding 
before being crucified. The unveiling of Akedah’s significances goes as far as bringing into discussion even issues 
related to Christological disputes. As a result, “The ram is a Pascal figure for Christians. […] According to some of 
the Holly Fathers, Isaac’s unaccomplished sacrifice foreshadows two consubstantial aspects of Jesus Christ: on the 
one hand, the divinity (Isaac does not die, remains unmoved, like the Logos), on the other hand, the humanity (the 
ram will die on the altar just like the human part of Jesus will die on the cross)” [15]. 
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4. Akedah – between ethics and justice 
Another key of interpretation for this difficult story is the one developed by authors such as Saint Augustine and 
Saint Thomas Aquinas. In Augustine’s opinion, the key of understanding akedah is given by the circumstance that 
the divine authority may make exceptions from its own law according to which humans are not allowed to kill. 
There are two possibilities to do this. God may grant a general exemption for those in a position of authority in order 
to protect the members of the community against violent murderers or external aggressors, or He may exempt an 
individual for a limited time interval. Anyway, when an exception was made, a person may determine someone 
else’s death without being charged with murder [16]. Dues to the fact that God make an exception from the 
command “Thou shalt not kill” when ordering Isaac’s sacrifice, Abraham does not break God’s command. 
Augustine’s solution proved to be influential in the late Middle Ages and adopted by theologians such as Bernard de 
Clairvaux. 
Thomas’ interpretation is slightly more nuanced. In his opinion, the intention of every lawmaker is focused firstly 
on the common good and secondly on the order of justice and virtue through which the common good is achieved 
and preserved. The percepts incorporating these intentions, such as “Thou shalt do justice”, are inviolable. Others 
admit exceptions when their violation rather serves than affects the order of justice or the common good. What holds 
true for lawmakers in general holds true for the divine lawmaker himself as well. God’s legislative intentions are 
directly expressed in the Decalogue. Each of us is a member of God’s community whose magistrate is Him and 
whom the common good depends on. Commandments such as “Thou shalt have no other gods before Me” and 
others lead directly to this common good. Commandments such as “Thou shalt not bear false witness” or “Thou 
shalt not unlawfully kill someone” express the order of justice that must be abide by among humans and according 
to which nobody can suffer anything unjustified. God’s intention, that everything is set right by Him, as the one 
representing the ultimate common good, is inviolable. But the particular divine percepts, such as the ritual rules of 
the temple, can be annulled when this serves God’s primary inviolable intentions [17]. 
5. From Kierkegaard to Levinas 
Fear and Trembling is dominated by Abraham’s figure, considered “the father of faith”, forefather of Messiah, 
model of obedience and incurrence of a relationship with an almighty, eternal God, the master of heaven and earth, 
the rightful judge of peoples and mankind, a wise, kind, merciful and immaculate being. The story of binding Isaac 
becomes for Kierkegaard an opportunity to build a dialectic of faith consisting of the simultaneous execution by the 
interiority of two contradictory movements: the infinite resignation, by giving up the world, and the movement of 
faith, by means of which the world is entirely regained. The analogy with Abraham is apparent: willing to sacrifice 
Isaac, Abraham is resigned as far as this world is concerned, becoming heirless, but being convinced every second 
that God will give him back his son. 
From an ethical point of view, Kierkegaard does not claim that Abraham must be excluded from the ethical 
universe. He loves his son but has to suspend his moral duty as a father in order to fulfill the will of an instance 
superior to ethics. Kierkegaard himself formulates the complexity of this theme when, before formulating and 
analyzing each problem (Is there a suspension of the ethics?, Is there an absolute duty towards God?, Was it 
ethically justifiable for Abraham to keep silent about his intention as far as Sarah, Eleazar and Isaac were 
concerned?), he says: “My intention is to depict from the story of Abraham (…) the dialectic wich resides in it, in 
order to see what an immense paradox faith implies, a paradox that may transform a killing into a sacred God 
pleasing act, a paradox that gives back Isaac to Abraham and which no thinking can encompass because faith begins 
where thinking stops” [18]. 
Abraham is a hero for Kierkegaard. He is a hero for Levinas as well, although not in the same sense. Both agree 
that God’s calling disturbs the Patriarch. Only on the foundation of this disturbance can a responsible individual 
enter a human solidarity that will not be the violence, called by Levinas “History” and “Politics” or its complement 
that is called by Kierkegaard “Christianity” [19]. 
6. Instead of conclusions 
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Finally, going back to the philological perspective, probably the most suitable when we talk about the relations 
between cultures and traditions, large studies of these two religious traditions have brought out the exegetic relations 
between Judaism and Christianity during the first six centuries A.D. and have demonstrated that the intersections 
were tighter than it has been thought. Developing a series of criteria that describe some exegetic encounters, it was 
possible to outline relationship between Christianity and Judaism based on familiarity. Such an analysis belongs to 
Edward Kessler who identified “three categories of interpretation: the first consisting of common interpretation, 
which indicates a common approach of the biblical text; a second one indicating possible exegetic intersections; and 
a third category which indicates probable exegetic intersections” [20]. 
The text from Genesis 22, central in both religious traditions, stimulated a rich diversity of interpretations during 
the first six centuries A.D, and Edward Kessler’s central thesis is that neither the Judaic interpretations, nor the 
Christian ones can be correctly understood without referring to each other. The existence of certain exegetic 
intersections has ramifications both for the study of the patristic texts, and of the rabbinic ones. To properly 
understand the Judaic and the Christian exegeses of the late antiquity, it is essential to take into account this 
relationship of interdependence. 
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